

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

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SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: HIGHLIGHTS: POST MEETING DISCUSSIONS, FEBRUARY 21,  
1975 (SALT TWO529)

1. VERIFICATION: SHCHUKIN, ASSISTED BY ASATIANI, SPENT NEARLY THE WHOLE ONE AND A HALF HOURS REITERATING AND SUBSTANTIATING THE SOVIET POSITION (TO MAY, A-723) THAT NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS WILL BE SUFFICIENT TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT SPECIFICALLY REGARDING MIRVS.

2. SHCHUKIN WAS "SURE" THAT IN THE COURSE OF TIME OUR SPECIALISTS WOULD LEARN TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN MIRV AND NON-MIRVED MISSILES. SHCHUKIN STATED THAT, IN TIME, AND USING ALL NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, INCLUDING NON PHOTOGRAPHIC ONES (A POINT HE MADE SEVERAL TIMES), A STUDY OF THE DETAILS OF THE MIRV DEPLOYMENT, INCLUDING SPECIFICALLY BUILDINGS AND PROCEDURES, WOULD CONVINCE US THAT NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS WERE ADEQUATE. IN ANSWER TO MAY'S DIRECT QUESTION, HE SAID HE WAS PERSONALLY FAMILIAR WITH THE OUTPUT OF NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION, ALTHOUGH NOT NECESSARILY ALL OF THEM, AS HE WAS NO SPECIALIST. AT ONE POINT, HE MADE A REFERENCE TO "NON SATELLITE"

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MEANS OF VERIFICATION.

3. MAY STATED THAT THE US HAD NO INTENT TO GO BEYOND NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS, BUT THAT WE SAW SOME PROBLEMS WITH REACHING UNAMBIGUOUS INTERPRETATIONS AND WE WELCOMED ANY SOLUTION THEY MIGHT HAVE TO THESE PROBLEMS. IN PARTICULAR, HOW DID HE PROPOSE THAT WE TELL APART A MIRVED AND A NON MIRVED SS-18 MISSILE WHEN DEPOLYED. SHCHUKIN REPEATED MUCH OF WHAT IS SUMMARIZED IN THE PARAGRAPH ABOVE, AND WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE PROBLEM WAS " EXAGGERATED" AND THE SOLUTION PUT FORTH BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON "UNJUST", IN THAT IT MIGHT COUNT UNMIRVED MISSILES AS MIRVED. MAY SAID WE HAD NO DESIRE TO BE UNJUST AND THEN WENT ON WITH THIS KIND OF DIALOGUE THROUGH QUESTIONS 2 AND 3 OF AMBASSADOR JOHNSONS FEBRUARY 12 SPEECH. SHCHUKIN REPEATED THE WORDS "EXAGGERATED" AND "UNJUST" ON EACH OCCASION. WITH REGARD TO THE 4 TH QUESTION, THAT OF CONVERSION FROM A MIRVED TO AN UNMIRVED LAUNCHER, HE MADE THE OBJECTION THAT THE QUESTION WAS "VERY THEORETICAL" AND WOULD NOT OCCUR IN REALITY FOR "QP TO 15 YEARS."

4. IN CONNECTION WIT HIS THESIS THAT THE EXPERTS WOULD LEARN IN TIME HOW TO DISTINGUISH MIRVED FROM NON MIRVED MISSILES, SHCHUKIN SAID REPEATEDLY THAT ONE OUGHT TO CONVINCE THE PUBLIC OF THIS, RATHER THAN RAISE A LOT OF QUESTIONS ABOUT MIRV VERIFICATION. MAY NOTED THAT WE NEEDED TO CONVINCE OURSELVES FIRST,AND THAT WE ALSO NEED TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR A CLEAR UNAMBIGUOUS INTERPRETATION OF THE AGREEMENT. SHCHUKIN AGREED AS TO THE LATTER, BUT RETRUNED AGAIN TO THE POINT THAT, WITH EXPERIENCE, THERE WOULD BE NO AMBIGUITIES.

5. TOWARD THE END OF THE CONVERSATION, SHCHUKIN SAID EMPHATICALLY THAT WHATEVER PROBLEMS THE US HAD WITH MIRV VERIFICATION WERE US PROBLEMS. HIS SIDE WAS " FULLY SATISFIED" THAT NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS UNAIDED WERE SUFFICIENT FOR VERIFYING COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT. HE EMPAHSIZED THIS POINT AT LEAST TWICE.

6. THROW-WEIGHT: WHEN THROW WEIGHT WAS MENTIONED (IN AN OTHERWISE LARGELY NON SUBSTANTIVE CONVERSATION), KARPOV (TO KLOSSON/EARLE, A-722) SAID, " AS FOR THROW WEIGHT, FORGET IT. JUST FORGET SECRET

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IT."

7. BACKFIRE: BELETSKY, IN CONVERSATION WITH ROWNY AND TRUSOV (A-724) ASKED WHY US HAD WAITED UNTIL NOW TO INTRODUCE BACKFIRE INTO NEGOTIATIONS. ROWNY SAID INTERIM AGREEMENT HAD NOT DEALT WITH HEAVY BOMBERS AND IT WAS NOT UNTIL VLADIVOSTOK THAT ANY AGREEMENT WAS REACHED TO LIMIT THEM. ALSO, US ONLY RECENTLY HAD CONCLUDED, BASED ON ACCUMULATED EVIDENCE, THAT BACKFIRE MUST

BE INCLUDED AMONG SOVIET HEAVY BOMBERS.

8. TRUSOV SAID IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT DECISION ON THE BACKFIRE BE BASED ON ITS INTENDED USE; WHEN A DESIGNER IS GIVEN A SPECIFIC MISSION TO FULFILL, THE RESULTING PRODUCT OFTEN APPEARS TO SOMEONE ELSE TO BE CAPABLE OF FULFILLING A DIFFERENT ROLE. ROWNY EMPHASIZED THAT CAPABILITIES, NOT INTENTIONS, MUST GOVERN COUNTING RULES. TRUSOV SAID HE WOULD BE INTERESTED IN DISCUSSING FB-111 CHARACTERISTICS SUCH AS PERFORMANCE, RANGE AND PAYLOAD. ROWNY SAID THAT SINCE FB-111 HAD NOT BEEN PROPOSED BY EITHER SIDE AS AIRCRAFT TO BE LIMITED, DISCUSSING IT WOULD BE IRRELEVANT.

9. ROWNY SAID HE WAS PERFECTLY WILLING TO EXCHANGE DETAILS OF TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS AND CAPABILITIES OF THE BACKFIRE SUCH AS RANGE, PAYLOAD AND PERFORMANCE. TRUSOV DECLINED, SAYING SIMPLY THAT THE BACKFIRE WAS NOT A HEAVY BOMBER AND THEREFORE THERE WAS NO NEED TO DISCUSS ITS DETAILS.

10. BELETSKY SAID US WAS WASTING ITS TIME SINCE IT HAD BEEN RESOLVED AT VLADIVOSTOK THAT THE BACKFIRE WOULD NOT BE COUNTED IN THE AGGREGATE. ROWNY SAID THIS WAS NOT US UNDERSTANDING; IF WE HAD BEEN TOLD THAT MATTER HAD BEEN FORECLOSED AT VLADIVOSTOK WE NATURALLY WOULD NOT BE BRINGING IT UP HERE.

11. IN REFERENCE TO ROWNY'S STATEMENT, SHCHUKIN NOTED TO MAY (A-723) THAT IT SEEMED A MISTAKE TO COMPARE A NEW BOMBER SUCH AS BACKFIRE WITH AN OLDER ONE SUCH AS THE MYASISHCHEV. MAY BELIEVED HIS IMPLICATION WAS THAT TECHNOLOGY MOVED ON AND NEW NON HEAVY BOMBERS COULD BE EXPECTED TO COMPARE FAVORABLY WITH OLDER HEAVY BOMBERS. SHCHUKIN SAID, FOR INSTANCE, THAT BACKFIRE WOULD NOT REACH THE US FROM THE SOVIET UNION WITH A PAYLOAD AND RETURN. JOHNSON

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